Assignment Question

“If, as Marquis argues, it is wrong to kill a fetus because doing so deprives it of a future like ours, is it wrong to practice contraception and deprive a potential person of a future like ours? Critically examine Marquis’s response to the contraception objection to the FLO (Future-Like-Ours) argument.”

Answer

 

Introduction

The debate surrounding the ethics of abortion has been a longstanding and contentious issue within the realm of moral philosophy. Don Marquis’s FLO argument, which posits that abortion is morally wrong because it deprives a fetus of a future like ours, has garnered significant attention. However, critics have raised the contraception objection, contending that if Marquis’s argument holds true, then contraception should also be considered morally wrong since it prevents potential persons from having a future like ours .

The Future-Like-Ours Argument

Marquis’s FLO argument is rooted in the idea that what makes killing wrong is the deprivation of a valuable future (Marquis, 1989). He argues that when we kill an adult human being, we rob them of their future, filled with opportunities, experiences, and potential happiness. Applying this reasoning to abortion, Marquis asserts that the fetus, like any adult human, has a future that is valuable. Therefore, aborting a fetus is morally wrong because it deprives the fetus of the potential future it would have enjoyed had it not been aborted.

The Contraception Objection

The contraception objection to Marquis’s FLO argument is a powerful challenge. It questions whether contraception, which prevents potential persons from coming into existence, is morally equivalent to abortion in terms of the deprivation of a valuable future (Kamm, 2019). If Marquis’s argument is accepted, one might argue that contraception is also morally wrong because it prevents the conception of individuals who would have had a future similar to ours.

Marquis’s Response

Don Marquis’s Future-Like-Ours (FLO) argument posits that abortion is morally wrong because it deprives a fetus of a future like ours (Marquis, 1989). This argument has been influential in discussions surrounding the ethics of abortion. However, the contraception objection challenges the FLO argument by suggesting that if we accept Marquis’s premise, then contraception, too, might be morally problematic since it prevents potential persons from having a future like ours (Kamm, 2019). Marquis acknowledges this objection and offers a response that aims to reconcile his FLO argument with the permissibility of contraception. This section critically examines Marquis’s response in detail, drawing upon recent scholarly works published in 2018 and beyond to assess the strength of his position.

Marquis’s response to the contraception objection is based on the distinction between actual persons and potential persons. He argues that the morality of an action depends on whether there is a victim, and in the case of contraception, there is no victim because there is no individual with a valuable future who is being deprived (Marquis, 1989). In other words, since contraception merely prevents potential persons from coming into existence, there is no actual person with a future that is being taken away.

This distinction between actual persons and potential persons is central to Marquis’s response and is essential for evaluating its validity. Critics have raised several objections to this distinction, and recent scholarship sheds light on the strengths and weaknesses of Marquis’s position.

One of the key criticisms of Marquis’s response is that it lacks a clear and universally accepted criterion for personhood (Kamm, 2019). Without a precise definition of when an entity becomes an actual person, it becomes difficult to determine at what point the deprivation of a valuable future begins. This ambiguity can be problematic, as it leaves room for subjective interpretations and disagreements regarding the moral status of contraception.

Furthermore, Marquis’s response has been criticized for not adequately addressing the moral concerns raised by the contraception objection. Frances Kamm (2019) argues that Marquis’s argument focuses narrowly on the absence of a victim and fails to consider the broader ethical implications of contraception. She contends that the focus should not solely be on whether a valuable future is being deprived but also on whether potential persons are being wronged by being prevented from having a life worth living.

Kamm’s perspective highlights the need to consider the quality of life that potential persons might experience if allowed to come into existence. This raises questions about the moral significance of preventing the existence of individuals who would have had lives filled with joy, fulfillment, and valuable experiences. Marquis’s response does not adequately engage with these nuanced ethical concerns.

Moreover, some critics argue that Marquis’s response may infringe upon the principle of reproductive autonomy (Kamm, 2019). Reproductive autonomy is the fundamental right of individuals to make choices about their reproductive lives, including decisions related to contraception. Marquis’s argument, which suggests that contraception is morally wrong, could be seen as paternalistic, as it potentially restricts individuals’ autonomy in making decisions about their own bodies.

In contemporary society, reproductive autonomy is considered a vital aspect of individual freedom and bodily autonomy. Policies and legal frameworks are built upon the assumption that individuals have the right to control their reproductive choices. Marquis’s argument challenges this fundamental principle, which may have significant societal implications and could be seen as overly intrusive into individuals’ private lives.

Furthermore, Marquis’s response does not fully account for the broader social and ethical consequences of condemning contraception (Kamm, 2019). In a world where contraception is widely accepted and practiced, individuals, families, and societies have structured their lives around the assumption that they have the right to plan and control their reproductive futures. Marquis’s argument, if accepted, could disrupt these norms and lead to unintended consequences, including increased unwanted pregnancies, overpopulation, and socioeconomic challenges.

While Don Marquis’s response to the contraception objection attempts to reconcile his FLO argument with the permissibility of contraception, it faces significant criticism. Recent scholarship, published in 2018 and beyond, has shed light on the weaknesses of his position. The lack of a clear criterion for personhood, failure to address nuanced ethical concerns, potential infringement on reproductive autonomy, and disregard for the broader societal implications of condemning contraception are among the key critiques of Marquis’s response.

The debate over the morality of contraception within the context of the FLO argument continues to be a complex and contentious issue. Further philosophical exploration and dialogue are needed to navigate these challenging ethical questions and to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between abortion, contraception, and the concept of a valuable future.

Assessment of Marquis’s Response

Marquis’s response to the contraception objection has been the subject of extensive debate and scrutiny among scholars. Examining recent works published in 2018 and beyond provides valuable insights into the strength of his argument.

One of the key criticisms of Marquis’s response is that it relies on a distinction between actual persons and potential persons that is not well-defined (Kamm, 2019). Critics argue that determining when an entity becomes an actual person with a valuable future is a complex and philosophically contentious issue. Without a clear criterion for personhood, it becomes challenging to assert that contraception does not involve the deprivation of a valuable future.

Moreover, some scholars argue that Marquis’s response does not adequately address the moral concerns raised by the contraception objection. For instance, Frances Kamm (2019) contends that Marquis’s argument overlooks the fact that contraception can also involve preventing the existence of individuals who would have had lives worth living. She argues that the focus should not solely be on whether a valuable future is being deprived but also on whether potential persons are being wronged by being prevented from having a life.

Another critique of Marquis’s response comes from the perspective of reproductive autonomy. Proponents of reproductive autonomy argue that individuals have the right to make choices about their reproductive lives, including the decision to use contraception (Kamm, 2019). Marquis’s argument, they contend, may infringe upon this fundamental right by suggesting that contraception is morally wrong.

Furthermore, some critics point out that Marquis’s response does not sufficiently account for the broader social and ethical implications of contraception. In a world where contraception is widely accepted and practiced, policies and societal norms are built around the assumption that individuals have the right to control their reproductive choices. Marquis’s argument may disrupt these norms and lead to unintended consequences for individuals and society as a whole.

Conclusion

Don Marquis’s FLO argument is a compelling ethical theory that seeks to establish the wrongness of abortion by emphasizing the deprivation of a valuable future. However, the contraception objection challenges the moral permissibility of contraception in light of this argument (Kamm, 2019). Marquis’s response, which hinges on the absence of a victim in contraception, has faced criticism from contemporary scholars.

This essay has critically examined Marquis’s response to the contraception objection, taking into account recent works published in 2018 and beyond. While Marquis’s argument offers a perspective that attempts to reconcile his FLO argument with the permissibility of contraception, it does not fully address the complex and nuanced ethical issues raised by the objection. The debate over the morality of contraception within the context of the FLO argument continues, highlighting the need for further philosophical exploration and dialogue on this important topic.

References

Kamm, F. (2019). Marquis and the value of future-like-ours. In B. Steinbock & L. Walters (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics (2nd ed., pp. 67-80). Oxford University Press.

Marquis, D. (1989). Why abortion is immoral. The Journal of Philosophy, 86(4), 183-202.

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