In March 2012, when the group Invisible Children launched a short film called “Kony2012”, it was intended to raise international awareness in regards to the atrocities and multiple human rights violation that had been perpetrated by the recognized terrorist group, xplain The movie depicted the group as an army of drunken and religious fanatics, whose journey was made of raping women, enslaving them and abducting children. The movie made a social impact and made sensation on different social networks and Media; many have even stated that it contributed to the US government sending troops to Uganda in order to capture Josef Kony and his affiliates. However, while the movie contributed to many people in America becoming aware of the LRA and their atrocities, it received numerous critics around the world, mostly from those who had extensively worked, researched, or those who were familiar with the multiple conflicts in the Great lakes region. The main critic of the movie, which was accused of practicing slacktivism, was about its over-simplification of the conflict. For instance, while they condemned the LRA, the money they received was redistributed to the military of Uganda to chase Kony, however many experts have criticized the Government handling of the war, and claimed that it has contributed as much as the LRA to a myriad of human violations. They also claim that the money has been used throughout the years for different means, both by The Government of Uganda, and Invisible Children, thus the traceability of the funds. Although the Kony 2012 campaign promoted social activism, it depicted a black and white picture of the situation in Uganda, the focus on Kony sends the wrong message. Notably, the movie gives the impression that his capture or death, could solve the conflict, the different images shown about Child soldiers glamorize the movie but nullify the effort to comprehend the phenomenon and the situation.
This paper’s intent is to shade lights on the conflict, tackling the social, political, economic aspect of it. To find a long term solution in a situation rooted in about over three decades of conflicts, it is important to understand the genesis of the conflict, the actors involved and their actions.
Over the years, Josef Kony has passed the stage of a mere wicked criminal abducting children, to a transnational terrorist. His nefarious actions have granted him that status, added to the fact that he moved from one country to the other, and from one region of Africa to another. The problems of transnational terrorism, state’s and non-state’s sponsor terrorism, are one that Invisible Children did not raise, but to comprehend the Ugandan civil war, those problems need to be addressed alongside different possible solutions, since they constitute an entire part of the conflict. Those who have limited the conflict in Uganda should understand the reasons and mechanisms that led the group to become descendant and to opt for rebellion as a tactic. “Rebellion is a strategy for winning concessions forms the government. It is used when conventional politics fails. At the extreme, rebels will demand and sometimes win complete removal of the regime in power or independent state to call their own” (saleyah 19). Thus, concerning Josef Kony and the LRA, although not justifiable, they are explainable reasons why Kony chose the bush, over politics.
Winston Churchill has once called Uganda the pearl of Africa, because of its biodiversity and natural resources; that was then. Uganda has been devastated by a civil war for almost three decades, a war that draws its origins ever since Uganda’s independence. The fragility of Uganda has not only come because of internal politics, but also because of its difficult regional context. Indeed, Uganda is a country that is located in the Great Lakes Region (GLR), a region that is usually identified as being made up of six states, namely DRC, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya and Tanzania. However, because of their colonial past and heritage, interlocking experiences and tribal groups, similar identities and common characteristics, some scholars have added couple countries when defining the GLR, such as Somalia, Southern Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Central African Republic, and Congo Brazzavile. Thus in this region, we could depict as much as six Regional Economic Communities, namely ECGLC (Economic Countries of the Great Lakes Region), COMESA (Common Market of Eastern and Southern African States), ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States), CEMAC(Central African Economic and Monetary Community), EAC (Eastern African community), IGAD (Inter-Government Authority on Development). The reasons why it is important to clearly identify these numerous organizations is to show that a problem occurring in Uganda has a far long reach to solely Uganda or the Great Lakes, but could have ramifications in the Eastern, Southern, and Central African Region. This will help in order to understand the interconnectivity existing in the region, and to identify that the mishandling of the situation of Uganda, could affect more countries than it already has. Understanding the region, also allows one to comprehend that each of those countries have interlocked interest in each other’s countries, thus it will allow to understand how and why different countries of the region have contributed to the escalation or de-escalation of the conflict. Some of the most known conflicts in the Great Lakes include the civils wars in Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi, and obviously the genocide of Rwanda. According to Kenneth Omeje and Tricia Hepner, the conflicts in the GLR has been plagued by many factors such as, “ethnic hostilities and pastoral conflicts in most states; as well as boundary disputes, cross-border rebel incursions, and interest-driven political interventionism”(omeje, hepner 1). Understanding theses interactions and occurrences, the fragile and unstable political situation and institutions, the ethnic enmity and conflict, added to the ambient poverty and lack of infrastructure is the genesis to comprehend the complexity of the conflicts in the GL in general, and in Uganda in particular. The occurring of Josef Kony as a transnational terrorist is just the result of a myriad of prior occurrences, and longstanding consequences deriving from a lack of regional cooperation. One can thus understand the multidimensionality of the conflict and the impossibility to find a ‘one size fits all’ solution. It is important to show the background and the Ugandan context, the interconnectivity between the countries of the region in order to have an overview of the situation. This will set the base for a reflection concerning the question about Kony being indeed a terrorist like depicted by most of the international community, or a freedom fighter?
The main reason why Uganda has suffered a three decades civil war, and has only known instability is laid in the conclusions of French writers Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, “Africa works well form the standpoint of the powerful political elites who not only profit from prevailing institutional and systemic dysfunctions, but also conveniently instrumentalize disorder, violence, and impunity for their primordial and self-serving advantages.”(omeje and hepner6’). This is the basis of the conflict, as the successive destructive regimes have ruled Uganda and have ethnicized the politics in that country. The instrumentalization of disorder has allowed some of those regimes to justify their use of repressive measures in order to quell any possible contestation. The correlation between ethno-nationalism and nationalism have also proven to be one of the major issue; Leaders tend to favor members of their ethnic tribes and want to impose that tribe as the main one in the country, by derogating some rules, privileging their group, and in the same token marginalizing other groups. “In Uganda, an important effect of the indirect protectorate administration was a division of the territory between the Bantu-speaking kingdoms of the south and the Nilotic- and Sudanic-speaking peoples of the north”(allen,vlassenroot 6). This division and separation has been the hallmark and has shaped the current situation and politics of Uganda. Equally to most countries in Africa, people first identify with their ethnic group, prior to their nationality.
The first president of Uganda was Milton Obote, from the Langi tribe of northern Uganda from the north, a sister tribe the Alcholi tribe (josef kony’s tribe). To assure his hands on the country, the government and the resources, Obote surrounded himself, practice by his fellow tribesman Langi, and Alcholi. Note that in Africa, favoring one’s ethnic group is a common practice. Obote selected Idi Amin, ethnically a northerner as well but who grew up in the south, as his army commander. He thought having a fellow northerner who was not directly from his tribe, who had lived in the South could balance and bring together closer the north and the south. However, Idi Amin quickly rose to power, and immediately replaced the Langi and Alcholi army leaders, by his own tribesmen. He eventually staged a military coup to oust Obote from power, and took control of the country. While in power, “one of his first acts was to murder Langi and Acholi soldiers in the army”(koen vlassenroot 6). This started the animosity of Langi and especially Acholi who felt more marginalized and repressed against, because under Obote, they used to occupy most of the high positions. Acholi felt, that Amin and his compares wanted to exterminate their tribes, thus they strongly stood against him. In 1978, Idi Amin invaded Tanzania after a border disagreement, in part to divert attention from his failure to shape and restore Uganda’s economy. A year after, a counter-invasion was led by the Tanzanian army and the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA); it had in its ranks a young southern Ugandan commander, Yoweri Museveni. Amin went on to exile in Libya, and died in 2003. After the successful counter-invasion, new elections which had Museveni, as a candidate were held, and Obote, who had been in exile, came out victorious. Museveni never accepted the outcome of the elections, and remained bitter by it. By the time Obote seized complete power and control of the military and government, most of the UNLA soldiers, and government officials were northerners, Langi or Acholi.
Unhappy with this, Museveni went into the bushes, and formed the National Resistance Army (NRA), a mixture of Tanzanians, Ugandans and mostly Rwandan fighters. Northerners called the NRA Banyarwanda (Tutsi or people coming from Rwanda). This three party combination shows the correlation between different countries, and shapes the political behavior of others in the region, a major tool to comprehend the extent of the situation in the GL.
Tired of his management of the army and his failure to concretely eliminate the threat coming from Musevini and the NRA, Obote’s own general, an Acholi called Bazilio Okello conducted a military coup and deposed him. The military installed Tito Okello, another Acholi, into power. On December 1985, an attempted peace deal was negotiated between the new president Okello and NRA’s leader Yoweri Musevini. However, it failed for mainly two reasons: Firstly, Musevini distrusted the Okello’s regime, claiming that it had too many ties with Obote, which Musevini had always disliked’; secondly he didn’t see in a good eye Northerners, especially Acholi be in control of the army and the government. A month after the attempted deal, Museveni and his NRA marched on Kampala, captured Gulu, Kitugm, and Pader which are the three biggest traditional bastions of the North; they demolished every Acholi resistance and pushed them further into deeper villages. Different claims of civilians, children, and women abuse occurred at that time; we will come back to it. Some of the Acholi soldiers of the UNLA managed to escape and relocated to neighboring Sudan, in order to avoid death or torture. The move to Sudan was facilitated by the fact that there is a large population of Sudanese Acholi, who didn’t find any issue welcoming their tribesmen. One can once again see the interconnection between all the tribal group and countries in the region. What is interesting is that Sudanese Acholi also had their share of issues in Sudan; while there was a civil war in Sudan between, the Sudan People Liberation army (SPLA) mostly made up of southerners from Sudan and from African decent led by John Garang, and Sudanese northeners who held the political power and were from arab decent. The Southern part of Sudan was inhabitated and dominated by a tribe called Dinka, which was a source of tension with Sudanese Acholi, who did not get along with them. Most of those Sudanese Acholi joined the Equatorian Defence Force (EDF), a force mounted and finance by the government of Karthoum(sudan), in order to fight the SPLA. Thus Sudan welcome Acholi defeated soldiers massively to recruit them in their militia, in order to face off the SPLA. Going back to Uganda, the fail peace treaty and the aftermath had place a big hurt among Acholi as they saw it as, “a source of deep-seated grievance among some Acholi, who claim that it shows President Museveni cannot be trusted, and has never really wanted peaceful reconciliation”(allen, vlassenroot 7). Having been defeated in Uganda, soldiers from the UNLA gather together in Sudan and formed the Uganda’s People’s Democratic Army (UPDA), which became the principal opposing force against Museveni’s regime. Being a paramilitary force, they launched a guerrilla war, without centralized command unit, which gave them the mobility to operate in different areas and rendering difficult to battle them or hurt the centrality of the movement, Josef Kony used the exact same tactics later on with his LRA, another example where we can see that Kony is actually more than foolish, but he has also learned from previous success and failures. The UPDA relied upon two thing; 1-the support of the villagers, and 2-their new found sanctuary state, which is Sudan. Those two element are very essential for an rebel group to be successful, because most insurgency depend on the support of the local population in many ways, added to that, having a sanctuary states is a guaranty for an assure hideout. While having a transnational rebel insurgency group, the Acholi people lacked leadership in the north, with most potential leaders having being arrested, killed, or simply surrendered. In the midst of this situation, came Alice Auma, a charismatic and inspired woman who came from the periphery of Gulu, one of the northern strong hold we spoke earlier, and that had been once captured and devastated by Musevini’s NRA, thus one can imagine the anger and bitterness still living inside her and her people. She claimed having been visited by a spirit called Lakwena, meaning the messeger, thus she created the religious group, Holy Spirit -Movement or Mobile Force (HSM/MF), she uses of spiritual force, and acclaim of being guided by Spirit, gave a certain approval, as Joan D’arc once had. At first, her small insurgency was compose of couple former UNLA soldiers and Acholi villagers who were living or hiding in far side villages and who did not joined the UPDA, but still had weapons and a mounted hanger toward Musevini and what he had done to Northeners. Arouse by their new leader and hope of turning the table around, Acholi’s became very supportive of the HSMF and the movement took a new fame when, “the BBC World Service, which during periods of 1986 and 1987 was reporting daily on the HMSF’s activities (allen, vlasenront 8). Having a well-known media reporting about their action was a moral boost for not only the HMSF members, but Acholi’s in Uganda, in Sudan and in the world. This success helped her attracting UPDA’s soldiers in the area and by the end of 1986 she approximately lead a group of 18000 soldiers. She used spiritual and religious methods in order to give courage to her soldiers; she anointed them with oil, force them to abstain from alcohol and sex, she smeared them with shea butter, while marching to combats, they held bibles and sing anthems, the relevance of those details are based on the fact that Josef kony used the same tactics, showing once again his capacity of learning, and using it to its advantage. With the bulk of her army ready, she left acholiland to march towards kampala in october 1987, they initially won numerous battles, and were amassing military gains and victories. However, a month later, she suffered a tremendous lost some 50miles away from Kampala. Thus, she fled to neighboring Kenya where she died in 2007. Back in Acholiland, the UPDA kept fighting using their base in Sudan; however in 1988 most of their soldiers either surrender to the Uganda’s government, or focus to fight the SPLA in Sudan because of the good remuneration that was offered to them by the government of Sudan (GoS). Those who did not want to surrender, decided to join other northern militias, such as the one of a young man called Josef Kony. Kony is a distant younger cousin of Lakwena, she inspired him, in her leadership approach and skills. He too, claimed to have been possess by spirits, one of them being Juma Oris, “the real Juma Oris, a minister under Idi Amin and one of the founders of the rebel UPDA, was alive and well at the time”(eeichastated 16). This shows, that one again, kony was astute; he used a UPDA respected leader who already had an established name as a way to attract those UPDA’s rebel in the Area toward him. As a leader, Kony uses, as Lakwena did, spiritual and psychological elements to convey and convince people to follow him. However, the military defeat of Lakwena made many soldiers reluctant to follow someone merely based on spiritual attributes. He still did not have the military notoriety to attract a massive amount of soldiers, and needed a push. This happened when Odong Latek, one of the most feared and effective leader of the UPDA joined the group and took control of the military operations. Contrarily to Kony, his notoriety was unquestionable and his military skills had already been proven on the combat field. The group used the name Uganda People Democratic Liberation Army (UPDLA), showing the proximity between the UPDA and the new UPDLA. Latek taught a great deal of warfare, military and guerilla tactics to Kony and the group. It is only after his death, that Josef kony became the true military leader of the faction, and to diverge from LAtek and affirm his new complete authority, he called the group the Lord Resistance Army, giving the group the divine connotation he always claimed, and the mental and psychological assurance every one of his soldiers wanted. The LRA thus became the only real force in Acholiland, which opposed the government of Uganda (GoU). The number of men Kony could never been completely identify, because he also benefited from a sanctuary state in Sudan. Kony took most of his men to Sudan because they would be out powered and outnumbered if they face the GoU army, however using guerilla tactics could be a major positive tactical element, something he had learn from UPDA. The advantage of crossing borders is obvious for a rebel group. Although the state has the power and control over the use of force in its territory, they cannot apply it to a neighboring country, unless that state is seeking for war. Thus strategically using neighboring countries is a big asset for transnational groups. Once, again, the question that should be raised is what are the factors are what are the internal factor that pushes a group to go transnational, and why the government is failing to maintain order, and the total integrity of the country? Answering those question could help, understand that the GoU have a big role to play in the civil war. One of many answers to this question could be the marginalization of a region, bad governance, tribalism, etc… We have seen that many Acholi were recruited by the Sudanese government to fight against the SPLA, however, there is another reason why the GoS helped different Uganda’s rebel groups; “After taking power in 1986, Museveni supported Garang’s fight against the Kharthoum government, and Garang was often seen in Kampala. In retaliation, the Khartoum government granted safe haven to Kony in Southern Sudan”(estachedt 18). Garang and Museveni had been long time friends, dating from their years at the University of Dar Es Salaam, in Tanzania. Garang had helped Musevini and the UNLA participate with the Tanzania army to the counter offensive that had ousted Idi Amin from power. One can see that the GoS and his president omar el Beshir, has applied the old Machavelian adage of the enemy of my enemy is my friend, which is the reasoning that is usual use when a country is engage in a proxy war. One can thus see that the story of the Josef Kony is way more complex compare to what was shown and depicted by the group Invisible Children. The enmity between the GoS and the GoU has allowed Kony’s men to have a permanent home base in Sudan, which, added to the fact that he learned from other group previous mistakes, permitted him to last much longer than any other groups that had fought against Musevini. The support from Sudan was at one point openly admitted by member of the Sudanese government as the speaker of the Sudanese Assembly, Hassan al-Turabi, say that, “ it’s natural. In all wars people do the same. If there’s a state of war between you and the other side, then you arm the other side’s opposition, don’t you?”(escthated 175). It is during this period that the Kidnapping and abduction, women enslavement of the LRA happen, the period that everyone has kept, forgetting how one got there and possible perspectives. Contrarily to what have been reported in Kony2012, we will show the strategic reasoning behind the abductions. To tackle the problem of child soldiers, one needs to understand and incorporate the meaning into a standing definition like the one in the Cape Town Principles and best practices that say that, “any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind or regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members”(opiyo 19). We could also add to this definition, girls that were recruited for sexual purposes or forced marriages. Using this definition has the base of the argument, validate the claim of a group such as the Inivisble children, but omit cold key facts of the reality occurring in the field. In the context of Uganda, the fight in Acholiland between the GoU and the LRA as made multiple victims and left people in the cross fire, and in the mercy of any groups. Thus, the solution for those children, it usually to find refuge in a group, in this case the LRA has the better claim to attract children because their claim is that they fighting for the good of Acholi people. Thus, many children voluntarily join the ranks of this group, either by conviction or protection. One also needs to understand the context and the culture; “In the Acholi culture, poverty is not defined by lack of money or resources alone. You are poor when you do not have anyone around you, especially extended family, and you lack the strength and energy to take care of yourself”(opiyo 33). Having lost their close relative, they are left in Lambo; the closest family that presents itself to them is the LRA. It is important to understand the atrocity that was made, by the NRA soldiers in their conquest of the north; they unleashed all the hatred they had towards the Acholi. Claiming that Joseph Kony is a brutal scruple less terrorist is probably true, but purposely waiving or omitting some clear realities does not help the situation but worsen it. The LRA did not have an army of angel and they also commit major atrocities, “In the early months of its conquest of Acholiland, some soldiers within te NRM/A began to rape both men and women, which to the Acholi would have amounted to excruciating cultural and psychological abuse”(opiyo, 49). That being said, one can thus see how those hideous occurring could prompt some men to join the LRA. The dishonor that comes with rape in many African societies is unprecedented; rape victims will often be outcast and left lonely. We have seen that for Acholi, loneliness is the biggest poverty, thus joining the LRA with a sense of belonging, and the hope for revenge is also not to be discounted. Thus, “according to a progress report on Uganda’s Millenium Development Goals, there is an obvious economic imbalance between the north and the rest of the country; the northerner region has maintained the highest incidence of poverty of 61 percent.”(omeje,hepner 92). Using this factual statistic, one could made a simple claim; Many young man, left without a job and better hope, who constantly see their situation worsen could be willing to take arms and join an insurgency. This was seen during the Arab spring in 2010, where unhappy and hopeless people seek to forcefully changed the already design outcome of their future, this was more apparent in Lybia and Syria. Going back to Uganda, poverty and lack off opportunities could be a factor of social unrest and boost to seek justice. Once again, this not to say that Kony has not abducted Children, but solving this issue requires a cold assessment, and different look on the conflict. In the case of Uganda, the case of politics is ethnicized and ethnicity being politicized avail to be completely true. The GoU has systematically insure that the northern part was discriminate and marginalized, thus it has encourage some young people, especially those kept away from schooling and job opportunities to dream and wish for a better future . More than a simple issue, we’ve seen that the problem in Uganda as many component, especially the problem of bad governance and ethnicity. Between 1985 and 2008, they were three major failed attemps to resolve the issue, notably the 1985 Nairobi Process which was between the Military government of Uganda and the NRA, then the peace talks between the NRA and the UPDA, and finally in Juba(southern Sudan) the LRA and the GoU peace negotiation. Those three different attempts highlight one fact; there is always one group predominantly representing the north and the other the south. So regarding the case of Josef Kony (who one should effectively perceive as a criminal), treating the issues has an anti-terrorist fight, like one would do against any other terrorist groups, does not solve the problem. The best approach should be by taking the Toro by his corns; Northerner are close to be seeking an autonomy or at least enjoy as much privilege as their southern counterpart. The radicalization of the LRA, and their unbecoming of being a nihilist organization, is in part due the perception of the international community regarding their cause. This started when, in 2002, Uganda was able to launch Operation Iron Fist into Sudan, who finally allowed the GoU to pursue LRA’s members on their soil. Having been so far, the sanctuary state, for the LRA, International pressure mounted against Sudan to eradicate the LRA, who had be named a terrorist organization. It is important to say that it was done a year after, the September 11 attacks against the world trade center, thus the US embark in the international fight against terrorism, “the united states was one among many foreign countries that provided direct cash support to the government”(175 eascjtated. This has also been an impediment for peace, because in the Ugandan governments where the corruption is rampant, there is no traceability of where the money goes, thus all the money involved could have actually been used only to serve the interests of top officials or military personnel. Thus, they might not have no real incentive to really find Kony or seek for peace, but all reasons to make the war lasted longer to continue to get sponsorship. Having been thus chase out of Sudan, the LRA find refuge in neighboring countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo and Central Africa Republic, countries that also had their share of conflict, rebellion, and insurgency groups. Some regions in those countries, offers a great hideout place. Kony continued to launch more vicious attacks in Sudan, and against local villagers in CRA and RDC to gain living resources. In DRC, the operation Lightening Thunder was launch by a tri-party (Uganda, Southern Sudan , and DRC) , the goal was to allow the Uganda’s army to go into DRC and fetch Kony. However, this could never work, not only because Congolese were reluctant to let yet again another military into their territory, as different rebellions, armies, insurgency have destabilize DRC, and rampage their natural resource. The other problem was the proximity between Rwanda and the NRA. Indeed, Josef Kabila, president of DRC, have fought the Movement of mars 23, (M23) and different know rebel leaders supported by Rwanda such as leaders of the Congress for the Defence of the People(CNDP )Laurent Nkunda and Bosco Ntaganda. Not only did CNDP fight a devastating civil war against the government of the DRC, they had the full support of Uganda and Rwanda. Thus one could imagine how reticent the authorities could be to let Uganda, once again on their territory. Vincent Otti, Kony’s number 2 at the time, had been reported to have brought soldiers in to Garamba Park in DRC. The park is located in oriental province, and border north Kivu where most rebels (especially those supported by Rwanda are located). One could claim that the government of DRC have let LRA’s men settle without complication, to combat and join other militia, due to their enmity past with Rwandese soldiers. In Central Africa, a territory that has been left out of control due to the different military coup and rebellion, Kony is said to have found refuge within the Ranks of the Anti Balaka(a Christian militia) fighting the SEleka ( a muslim militia). The instability of those regions and countries has facilitated kony’s hideout. When the Juba peace talks took place between 2006-2008 under the UN secretary General Special envoy President Joakim Chissano, and the chief mediator of the host country (Southern Sudan) Dr Riek Machar, many saw it as the final outcome for a possible resolution of the conflict, because of the different agreement that was made. Parties agreed to a demobilization, demilitarization, and reintegration (DDR) for the LRA combatants. It was supposed to be completed by a process of Implementation and Management Mechanisms (IMM). Many African society always put in process the concept of l’arbre a palabre (palaver tree), to solve their issues. It is a way to sit all belligerents on one table and to reunite a conseil de sages (a council of elders/wisepersons) to find peaceful means to solve a conflict. Thus was created a forum where reconciliation, pardon, and accountability would be created. The GoU also took the initiative to “provide for an Amnesty for Ugandans involved in acts of a war-like nature in various parts of the country and for other connected purposes”(omeje and Hepner 97). The objectives of all of those talks and agreements, was to naturally stop the conflict, reconcile Ugandans, and integrated notheners and others in the society. However, the LRA has always refused neither to sign the peace agreement nor to participate in any project of Amnesty act. Many has view it as the obvious sign of their lack of interest in peace, however, like we mentioned earlier in the paper, many Acholi and specially LRA fighters feel like Musevini cannot be trusted, and never really wanted reconciliation in the first place. This grievance was accentuate with the fact that although all those forum were made to peaceful conflict resolution, Josef Kony and four of his top commander( Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen) were indicted by the ICC and chief prosecutor at the time Moreno Ocampo in 2005, after Musevini approached them two years prior. Indeed, the Internatinal Criminal Court (ICC) does not take into account traditional justice. Also, looking solely on the conflict and people that have been indicted so far, one can affirm that it is the case of justice of the winners. Although it has been well established that the LRA and the NRA have both committed human rights violations, only LRA combatants have been indicted. For Acholi people, this also represents a slap in the face, giving that some tribal group have their own justice system, and all tribesmen are subject to it. Sometimes they even have authority over national laws, or they can come as complement to them. For Alcholi, they have what they call the mato oput(drinking the bitter root). It consists of reconciliation by the mean of compensation and forgetting about revenge. Not including this aspect while dealing with a conflict like the one between the LRA and the GoU, can not set for a positive outcome. It gives no incentive to LRA combatants and their leaders to drop the weapons and sit down at the negotiation table. The indictement of the ICC have push backs any hope of peace because their methods does not fit with African justice, “the ICC intervention is therefore a neocolonial experiment that ignores the realities and understandings of the victims. Instead, traditional justice measures should be embraced as a more appropriate and viable alternative”(244 allen,vlassenroot). Recently, we have also seen how the involvement of the ICC in the case of Cote D’ivoire (the capture of former president Gbagbo) has been a blow to all efforts of possible reconciliation between the partisans of new president Allassan Ouattara and those of former president Laurent Gbagbo. Efforts made to bring all sides to the table can only come possible if all actors, especially those of the international community take the problem in its corps, not only overviewing the issue and finding an easy solution, point their fingers to one direction. Not mentioning the case of Kizza Besigye will be a travesty in order to explain the approach that was made concerning Josef Kony and the LRA. Besigye is a former UPDF combatant, from the south of Uganda, that have since then be one of the most vocal person to oppose the regime of Mussevini. Although arrested several times, allegedly to have been conspiring against the government and trahison, he kept fighting politically although lost Presidential elections several times against Yuweri Mussevini. This shows that, the root of the problem here is also a problem of democracy, good governance, equality, etc. what is even more suprising is the report made in 2012 by the US state department, “Serious human rights problems in the country included arbitrary killings; vigilante killings; mob and ethnic violence; torture and abuse of suspects and detainees; harsh prison conditions; official impunity; arbitrary and politically motivated arrest and detention” the report will aslo state “; incommunicado and lengthy pretrial detention; restrictions on the right to a fair trial and on freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association; restrictions on opposition parties; electoral irregularities; official corruption;” to conclude this long list its states that “violence and discrimination against women and children, including female genital mutilation (FGM), sexual abuse of children, and the ritual killing of children; trafficking in persons” (http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154375.htm). This long list, of violation should raise questioning over the GoU behavior, however, they keep getting sponsorship to combat the LRA. This should be a refrainer and high openers for those who miss understand the conflict in Uganda. The LRA never had a chance to publish their manifesto, which elaborate their plan in detail. The Government use of state media have prohibited any publicity or the LRA and has contributed to depictate a religious criminal without a true agenda nor revendication, however “end of war through negotiations, the national political integration of Acholi on a equal basis with the rest of the country, an end to government violence against Acholi, reparations for lost cattle, free elections, and even multipartyism”. (Branch 2011: 75). ( Branch, A. (2011) ‘Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda’. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, New York, NY. ) Those were clear sense base elements that were in LRA manifesto, not published because it could change public opinion about them.
In conclusion, no one can deny the fact the LRA has been a major problem for Uganda over the years. They have been label by the international community as a terrorist organization, and groups the Invisible children have painted the group as an army of ruthless thugs. However, if one is really interest in solving issues, they should tackle the problem by its roots and not find over simplify solution made on an over simply claimed. One of many solution should be the involvement of the international community to condemn the mistreatment of Acholi in the north, on top of it, they should assure that the government is conducting good governance. the involvement of the ICC have also been a major impediment, because it does not really track down the problem, but have chosen who should be blame. National justice, and initiatives taken by the states should also be viewed as important, and primordial to find adequate solutions. Finally, a better gestion of borders is required to not allow different groups and militias come in and out a country.
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