Military Decision Making Process (MDMP)
Requirement #1
Col. Mucci, for this raid, decided on the 6th Ranger’s Company C that was to be commanded by Capt. Robert W. Prince. It was reinforced by 1st Lt. John F. Murphy led 2nd Platoon of Company F. Also included in this mission were two teams of Sixth Army’s elite recon unit, the Alamo Scouts, and Four combat photographers from the 832nd Signal Service Battalion. The Ranger force, in total was to consist of 120 enlisted men and 8 officers[i]. Critical to this mission was invaluable support from some hundreds of Filipino guerrillas that were under the command of Captains Juan Pajota and Eduardo Joson. The guerrillas’ main purpose was to provide route security, an interface with the civilian population and intelligence reports. Furthermore, the guerrillas were also to play an extremely critical combat role when the camp assault began. Col. Mucci, ahead of the raid, gave the volunteers an opportunity back out of the mission, during a briefing. However, all the men re-volunteered. When the raid began, the Rangers wore fatigue uniforms and soft caps, following Mucci’s instructions, which had no badges of rank or insignias. Riflemen used their choice of M-1 carbine or M-1 Garand rifle. Browning Automatic Rifles were used by men from the weapons sections, while most noncommissioned officers preferred the Thompson submachine gun or alternatively a .45-caliber pistol. Col. Mucci weapon was a .45-caliber pistol. However, a majority of officers took along to the raid rifles as well as their pistols[ii].
On 28 January, at 0500hrs, the Rangers moved out only to halt at Guimba. Here, they left with the native guides at 1400hrs marching to near Lobong, a guerrilla camp, about five miles he southeast. Here they linked up with guerillas under the command of Captain Joson. The combined forces continued their march and by nightfall, they were behind Japanese lines. In the village of Balincarin, these forces were joined another force under Pajota’s command, obtaining the latest intelligence as obtained from the Alamo Scouts. Prince, working together with Pajota arranged and planned how the guerillas were to collect enough carabao carts to be used to transport the liberated POWs who too weak to walk, prepare food enough for hundreds of men and provide security for the liberated POWs[iii].
Col. Mucci was to, however, delay the planned raid for an extra day with the purpose of gathering additional intelligence. The delay was also meant to allow for a large Japanese force transiting in the vicinity to depart. This delay proved to be a tactical advantage as the Rangers were able to gather more detailed information regarding the camp and its defense
The plan by Col. Mucci was for a night assault on the compound. This plan handed Filipino guerillas the unenviable mission to stop enemy counter forces from approaching from the nearby Cabu and Cabanatuan City. To achieve this, a part of the force’s Bazooka section was attached to the guerillas meant to counter any incoming Japanese tanks. The integral Ranger force was meant to attack the camp from two sides. Murphy’s led 2nd Platoon of Company F was to assault the entrance from the rear, with Company C led by Prince assaulting the camp through the front gate. Pajota recommended that a Northrop P-61 Black Widow night fighter flies overhead, before to the attack, to act as a distraction to the camp defenses.
Careful planning and skillful reconnaissance paid off, the result being a well-executed, swift attack. The combined forces initially moved into position January, 30, 1944 at twilight. A section of the Rangers, Company C, crawled a mile across open ground so that they could reach the front of the camp, their jump-off position. The Northrop P-61 overhead flight was successful it managed to draw the guards and prisoners attentions to the sky. Murphy fired, as planned, the first shot, at 1945hrs giving signal that the 2nd Platoon of Company F troops were in position. This was the signal that marked the commencement of the attack. The Japanese soldiers were hit with an overwhelming ferocity by the Rangers as they used each weapon available to them. The guard towers were the first to be taken out, all Japanese soldiers exposed and pillboxes. All of these positions had to be secured so that the troops could attack the compound and completed the elimination of enemy soldiers and interior defensive positions[iv].
At the same time, teams assigned to block positions efficiently did their assignments. Men under the command of Pajota opened fire to Japanese battalions near Cabu Creek. Machine gunners comprised of Guerilla forces were successful in countering Japanese counterattacks. This was especially so at the Cabu Creek bridge. The Ranger bazooka party was able to take out a truck and two tanks. Joson had set up another roadblock together with his men, however, it was never attacked. This is attributed to the P-61 fighter attack on a Japanese convoy that was headed in that direction. The raid by the Rangers was so successful that in less than 15 minutes, inside the POW compound, the resistance had been eliminated. However, the Rangers suffered casualties though a final trio of mortar rounds that resulted in six men wounded[v]. Captain James C. Fisher, was one of the soldiers wounded and was among the two Rangers who lost their lives in the raid.
Requirement #2
As much as the Rangers were successful in their mission, Col. Mucci and his men faced difficult challenges. The greatest of these challenges was that the Japanese, by the time the raid was planned, had already moved and evacuated most of its prisoners. The headquarters of the Sixth Army feared the Japanese might move the remaining prisoners up to the northeast or even kill prisoners to avoid rescue missions or prevent their liberation. Col. Mucci saved a massive challenge to prevent this from happening. If these possibilities were to be avoided, American forces had initially to take the compound where the prisoners were held by surprise. This was to be done ahead of the arrival of the main forces in the area. The prisoners were then to be evacuated to behind friendly lines. All this was to be done by Col. Mucci before a Japanese counter reaction took place. This complex and extremely difficult mission was assigned to the 6th Ranger Battalion by Krueger on the recommendation of Colonel Horton White, his G2[vi].
Requirement #3
Liberate in military terms is defined as the retaking of any area or person(s), domestic, neutral, or friendly, by friendly forces which, previously had been occupied by enemy forces or abducted by enemy forces.
A Raid is an operation that is aimed to temporarily seize an area for the purpose of capturing personnel or equipment, securing information, to destroy a capability or to confuse an
adversary. A raid will usually end with a planned withdrawal of troops upon the completion of the planned and assigned mission[vii].
To secure, in the context of an operation or mission is described as to gain possession of a person(s), position or terrain feature through use of force or at times with no use of force. The aim of this is to prevent, the secured item’s destruction or loss as a result of enemy’s actions[viii].
This particular mission by the Rangers can be best described as a Raid. The aim of the mission was to temporary seize the Japanese compound and obtain the prisoners. After the success of this mission, the Rangers moved out immediately.
Requirement #4
The Alamo Scouts were crucial to the raid as they played a key role in surveillance of the objective. All the scout teams left the Rangers’ base camp that was set up at Calasiao on January 27 afternoon, and marched to Guimba, where there was a guerillas headquarter. There they were joined by some of the native guides. They then proceeded to Platero that was three miles north of the camp that was the primary objective. Once there, they contacted the local guerrillas there, together they kept the camp under surveillance. They determined the exact number of Japanese troops on the ground, identified the guards marking the guards’ routines. All the information gathered by the Alamo Scouts was relayed to the Rangers during their arrival.
The 1st Platoon, Company C, was commanded by First Lieutenant William J. O’Connell. The purpose of this platoon was to attack and force open the camp’s front gate. This platoon was also tasked with killing Japanese soldiers in several other known locations. These locations included the highway where a platoon led by Seargent Jensen, was supposed to attack and also kill guards situated in nearby guard houses and at the gate. This platoon was to gain entry to the camp. There was a Sergeant Homer E. Britzius’s led 2nd Section, whose task was to cross the highway and support the action by the 1st section[ix]. They were to do this by firing at enemies from across the fence.
Then there was the 2d Platoon, Company C, which was under the command of First Lieutenant Melville H. Schmidt. This platoon’s task track behind the 1st Platoon as it stormed into the compound. This platoon was to attack and secure the area of the camp where the prisoners were held. The troops in this platoon were to begin evacuating the prisoners while at the same time providing close fire support to its friendly forces. In particular, the 1st Section, under the command of Staff Sergeant Clifton Harris, had the task of entering the camp immediately after the 1st Platoon, attack and force its way through the entrance to where the prisoners were enclosed. These troops were to fire towards the pillbox that was already under attack by the 2d Platoon, Company F. Staff Sergeant William R. Butler, led the 2d Section that was to follow, allow entry to the 1st section platoon, proceed to the right flank where the prisoners were enclosure all intended to prevent Japanese troops from accessing it[x]. There was a Weapons Section, under the command of Staff Sergeant August T. Stern, Jr., that had orders to remain in reserve when the attacks began. They were responsible for directing the rescued prisoners through the main gate and after all were safely through start marching them north.
The 2d Platoon, Company F, responsibility was to eliminate the guards stationed at the back entrance of the stores. They were also tasked with trying to prevent the Japanese troops from advancing into the camp area where the targeted prisoners were situated. Comprising the platoon, six men were specifically detailed and under orders to destroy the pillbox that was situated at the stockade’s northeast corner.
Guerrillas that were under the command of Captain Jason’s were tasked with establishing a roadblock. This roadblock was to be 800 yards southwest of the targeted camp and on the highway and its purpose was to stop Japanese reinforcements who happened to advance from Cabanatuan City. A Bazooka team, was tasked with this mission, comprised of six men and commanded by Staff Sergeant James O. supporting this platoon was the White of 2d Platoon, Company. They were tasked with giving the guerrillas protection from tanks[xi].
Requirement #5
Col. Mucci’s decision to delay the planned raid for an extra day was with the purpose of gathering additional intelligence. The delay was also meant to allow for a large Japanese force transiting in the vicinity to depart. If Col. Mucci had not taken this decision then probably the raid would have been successful as it was. The colonel took this decision after considering the situation on the ground, the tactical advantage was compromised hence the change of the attack time. This delay proved to be a tactical advantage as the Rangers were able to gather more detailed information regarding the camp and its defense
Requirement #6
As of January 29th 1945, the plan was to attack the Japanese compound as planned during nightfall. However after surveillance, the Alamo scouts discovered that there were additional Japanese troops on transits that had camped in the target area. The change of the situation in the ground called for a tactical change. Colonel Mucci in consultation with his other officers decided on delaying the raid by a day. The additional Japanese soldiers had the ability to be the difference between a successful raid and a failed attempt. The troops were all in position as at 29th therefore all that they had to do was to hold their position for a little while longer.
Requirement #7
Critical to this mission from the start was invaluable support from some hundreds of Filipino guerrillas that were under the command of Captains Juan Pajota and Eduardo Joson. The guerrillas’ main purpose was to provide route security, an interface with the civilian population and intelligence reports. The guerillas were the solution to moving the rescued POWs towards the Ranger’s camp. If the troops continued to move towards their camp at a slow pace, there was the possibility of attack from the Japanese soldiers. After the attack, no doubt, the Japanese would have called for reinforcements from other stations. This means that they would be irate and baying for their attackers’ blood. Therefore, the slow pace of advancement by the Rangers could play to the advantage of the Japanese troops who would quickly track and attack them. Given the number of civilians in their midst, the casualty number could be substantial. Staying in the camp that they had already attacked would have been an even worse idea. The Japanese were already aware of an attack against them so they would regroup and attack the camp. Therefore, I would advise the Colonel not to stay in the camp rather move out as quickly as possible. Moving out of the camp and finding a concealed would be the best tactical movie for Col. Mucci’s troops. This way, the Japanese would not be in a possible to know the moves of the troops. From this position, the guerillas would be able to acquire more carts and conduct surveillance on the movement of the Japanese troops. Here, the colonel and his officers would be able to come up with an escape plan or wait for reinforcements
Bibliography
Alexander, Larry. Shadows in the Jungle: The Alamo Scouts Behind Japanese Lines in World War II. Penguin Group. 2009
Breuer, William B. The Great Raid on Cabanatuan. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 1994
Hunt, Ray C. Behind Japanese Lines: An American Guerrilla in the Philippines. University Press of Kentucky. 1986
Rottman, Gordon. The Cabanatuan Prison Raid – The Philippines 1945. Osprey Publishing; Osprey Raid Series #3. 2009
[i]Breuer, William B. The Great Raid on Cabanatuan. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 1994
[ii] Hunt, 1986
[iii] Hunt, Ray C. Behind Japanese Lines: An American Guerrilla in the Philippines. University Press of Kentucky. 1986
[iv] Hunt, Ray C. Behind Japanese Lines: An American Guerrilla in the Philippines. University Press of Kentucky. 1986
[v] Alexander 2009
- Rottman, Gordon. The Cabanatuan Prison Raid – The Philippines 1945. Osprey Publishing; Osprey Raid Series #3. 2009
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