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CookCounty Administration Report
At approximately five o’clock on a Friday evening on 17 October 2003, a fire broke out in the CookCountyAdministrationBuilding’s 12th floor, in Chicago west Washington street Illinois. The fire was thought to have originated from the building’s southeast corner in a storage closet, eventually leading to the death of six people. There have been few reported cases of fire tragedies in high-rise buildings (excluding the terrorist attacks on the WorldTradeCenter). Similar to other tragic fires like the Iroquois Theatre Fire back in 1903, or the 1871 Great Chicago fire, the Cook County Administration fire did not only serve as a significant lesson that we can learn from, but is also a horrible tragedy that affected to those that are directly connected to either the victims or survivors. This review was conducted to reveal the facts related to the tragedies that lead to deaths and as well as multiple injuries, and to highlight on the lessons learnt in order to formulate recommendations aimed at improving high rise safety tragedies through out entire state. The report’s findings and recommendations will highlight on ways to improve safety in case of any fire in Illinois, as well as adding information to the knowledge body relating to emergencies.
My approach on the Cook County Administration Building fire incident, similar to other consequence and crisis reviews on management, involved four phases; mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. The relationship between these phases of emergency is interconnected and dynamic, as well as having specific characteristics. On mitigation, this emergency phase includes taking actions aimed at reducing a hazard’s impact, actions like changing building systems or building codes. Preparedness phase includes aspects on training, planning, preparing as well as exercises. Response phase includes procedures undertaken in order to save property and lives in case of an emergency. This may involve search and rescue, evacuation, fire suppression, and emergency sheltering. This phase may also involve behind the scene maneuvers like incident command centers establishment and activation of emergency plan centers (EOC). Recovery phase involves all endeavors undertaken with view of returning the community back to its normal or near normal state. This may involve touching on reconstruction facilities, securing financial assistance for the victims, and review of response activities.
My review focused on life and safety lapse factors that lead that deaths and damage. I did not endeavor in determining the fire’s cause or area of origin. Information based on area of origin was acquired from eyewitness statements and official reports.
Incident Summary
The following statement is a detailed summary highlighting on the major scenes that took place on Friday 17 October 2003. At an estimated time of five o’clock in the evening, a fire broke out in the office of the division’s business service in a storage closet. This was on Cook County Administration building’s 12th floor. The management personnel as well as the security officers immediately responded to the emergency with 9-1-1 being alerted in the process and building evacuation processes commenced. The occupants in the building did not perceive any audible fire alarm signal. They were however alerted by the security personnel being guided through the EVAC (emergency voice alarm communication) by way of elevators and stairways. Those who used the northwest and southwest stairways, elevators and floors below the fire floor managed to evacuate safely. The security officer at the front desk made an emergency call to 9-1-1 at two minutes past five. The first squadron of the fire brigade arrived at arrived at the location four minutes later with the initial fire extinguishing operations commencing at 5:16 from the southeast stairway.
Once the fire brigade team breached the stairway and smoke tower doors, the area was filled with smoke and heat thereby preventing further escape from people attempting to use this route. The intense heat and fire prevented the rescue team from accessing the base floor in order to attack the fire seat, rendering their efforts useless. This prompted the team to withdraw an interior attack maneuver and employed external efforts using tower ladders as a means of operation. This process began at around eight minutes to six and concluded fifteen minutes later.
Through out the response phase, many calls for help and missing persons notifications were made to the police department as well as the fire department through face-to-face encounters, 9-1-1 operations, and through on scene. However, thorough searching efforts were not immediately implemented due to multiplicity of failures in communication and command. Calls related to missing persons, unaccounted for, or stranded in the building mainly in the southeast stairway were not reacted upon in a timely manner, nor were directions received from the commander in charge. From the overall thirteen individuals trapped in the southeast stairway, seven managed to escape while the remaining six unfortunately succumbed to the raging fire. The entire seventeen occupants in the southeast stairway were not found by the rescue team until approximately ninety minutes preceding the first alarm.
Major Findings
My review concluded numerous scenes of inconsistency, failure, ineffectiveness, and failure to comply by individuals and organizations, several agencies on their part, some of which were directly responsible for the incident’s loss of lives and injuries. Nevertheless, despite the relevant findings, it is in my opinion that four relevant factors greatly contributed to the fatalities. One involved the lack of adequate fire sprinklers. These devices would have played the role of controlling or even to a better cause extinguishing the inferno in its earlier stages. Secondly, the failure of the fire department in question to effectively and adequately look and account for any of the building’s occupants before and during the fire extinguishing operation. If they had implemented this maneuver, they fatalities would have been reduced or even prevented. Thirdly, I also think that the fire department was partly at fault for the fatalities suffered. This is because of the fact that they breached the southeast stairway allowing smoke and heat to penetrate the area, making the environment unbearable preventing further escape by the occupants. It is most notable that the fatalities incurred are of those that were trapped in this area. Finally, the other factor that contributed to the deaths and injuries can be attributed to the locked stairway doors. This access route inhibited the occupants with an escape option that would have proved to be very significant.
Conclusion and Recommendations
In the course of any inferno, occupants in the building should be prioritized highest by the commander in charge, fire rescue team, as well as all other relevant authorities in the scene of fire. Two ways can be deduced that aim to achieve this objective; protecting the occupants from the fire danger by rescuing and evacuating them, or effectively dealing with threat by efficiently extinguishing the fire. High-rise buildings are often characterized by large numbers of occupants. Therefore, the most valid solution would be primarily extinguishing the fire rather than attempting to evacuate the occupants. In this particular case however, the process of evacuation had already began prior to fire extinguishing operations, with the systems of communications directing the occupants to escape thought the stairways. Hence, it should be a certain assumption that occupants would be using the stairways; therefore, any extinguishing operations would hamper their escape maneuvers. In my opinion, actions on this fire incident were based on operations aimed at extinguishing the fire. They were not focused on determining the safety risk levels of the situation. The priority at every incident of emergency should be focused on the safety of the human lives at risk.
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