Global Justice Shrinking Distance Expanding Obligations by Nicole Hassoun

Introduction

Emerging voices have been featuring from regular contributions from practitioners and scholars who highlight new thinking, research, and approaches to development challenges (Hassoun, 25). This paper serves as a review of the article, “Globalization and Global Justices” by Nicole Hassoun. Nicole currently serves as an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Carnegie. Her articles can be viewed journals such as the public affairs quarterly and The Journal of Applied Ethics. Hassoun outlines a proposal from her book aimed at creating a health label for investing in medicines by pharmaceuticals needed by the global poor.

Analysis

Most people believe that we possess moral duties towards reducing global poverty. However, philosophers have a different standing towards the considerations and duties that justify them. Nicole Hassoun in her book, Globalization and Global Justice, looks to develop a new approach towards justifying obligations of reducing global poverty. The distinctive aspect in Hassoun’s approach manifests itself in her appealing way, which deals with requirements of political legitimacy with an intention of grounding duties to helping the global poor. In this regard, Hassoun’s book differs from other prominent accounts on global poverty that look to deal with global poverty by appealing to duties to refraining from harming people, duties of beneficence, and duties to global distributive justice. The book has been designed to include two clear and descriptive chapters. The first part includes three chapters that Hassoun uses to argue for the legitimate international institutions, and their need to ensure that people are entitled to basic needs like shelter, food, water, and healthcare.

Chapter one of Hassoun’s book surveys the debates from philosophers with the belief that people bear the positive right to basic necessities. This chapter allows us to consider how Hassoun is sympathetic considering people’s rights to basic necessities. She maintains that those who defend these kinds of rights are yet to give libertarians assertive reasons that foster the belief of significant duties towards the global poor (Hassoun, 34). In this case, Hassoun sets out in a course of developing arguments to solicit for duties towards the global poor capable of persuading libertarians. In particular, Hassoun aims at showing the negative right against coercion that entails positive rights to human necessities such as water, shelter, and food.

In chapters two and three of part one, Hassoun sets to defend her central argument. She formulates her argument in an organized manner. This involves emphasis of legitimizing coercive institutions. To achieve this feat, Hassoun maintains that there is a need to secure food and water and most importantly shelter. According to the book, these institutions have to ensure that poor people access food, water, and any other commodity that is deemed necessary. Before I air my view on this particular argument, allow me to clarify on the first and second premises of her two other chapters. In accordance with Hassoun, an institution should be regarded legitimate when morally permissible to use coercion for enforcing rules and commands. In this case, legitimacy should be considered different from justice. Even though an institution can be legitimate in having permission to coerce, it bears the capability of failing tom live up to maximal justice (Hassoun, 47). Legitimacy should also be considered to differ from justified authority. Putting this into consideration, people may not have an incentive to comply to duties to comply with legitimate institution demands. Therefore, liberty is a right of coercion.

From the book, we can assume that the autonomy argument by Hassoun is seemingly trivial. The mere claim that institutions in their cause are coercive is plausible. According to Hassoun’s argument, for one to enjoy “sufficient autonomy,” he or she has to gain access to water, food, and other basic commodities such as shelter. People lack the ability of exercising the capabilities of reasoning and planning if they do not have access to these necessities. As Hassoun maintains, international institutions such as the United Nations issue clear credible coercion threats. Other international institutions such as the World Trade Organization as well as the International Monetary Fund normally pass rules without people’s consent even if concerned states are in agreement with these rules (Hassoun, 64).

A part of this book seemingly reveals a problematic premise. In this case, Hassoun endeavors to ascertain libertarians’ commitments involve relevant duties that help the poor, despite their positive right rejection. This assertion by Hassoun raises the question to why libertarians should endorse claims that legitimate institutions should ensure people living in poor standards secure autonomy sufficiently. Libertarian can in one-way respond that legitimate institutions should respect people’s negative rights to noninterference. A libertarian can in this case reject the notion that institutions have a need of providing people with autonomy prerequisites of achieving legitimacy. While this position of libertarians strikes me as seriously plausible, the position nonetheless seems coherent.

For purposes of reviewing the problem with Hassoun’s argument, I decided to include the consideration for the following case. Take, for example, John who lives in the wilderness. Mentally, John is competent enough and bears the capacity to plan and reason as well. However, one should not overlook the fact that John is starving since he does not have sufficient food to facilitate his survival. Another person in the same picture, Michael, goes on to encounter John in the Wilderness. Michael, in this particular situation, possesses a gun and without provocation urges Bradley to fetch her watch, build shelter, and perform other similar services. If this example is put into consideration, libertarians maintain that Michael bears a negative duty to refrain from negatively interfering with the life of John unless he passes his consent.

In the second part, Hassoun delves into empirical and complex debates on ways of reducing global poverty. I was able to notice that this section is independent of the three chapters in the first part. In the second part, Hassoun attempts to survey the empirical evidence on the efficiency of reducing devastating poverty through foreign aid. Particularly, Hassoun considers the effect on foreign aid by macro level studies. She sensibly concludes that on certain scenes, foreign aid does indeed reduce poverty. However, as she acknowledges, this should not be considered the foremost issue regarding policy debates on foreign aid. Rather, the debate should delve into how often foreign aid is capable of reducing poverty.

Conclusion

To consider the book Globalization and Global Justices, Hassoun considers micro level studies evidence including quasi-experimented studies. Her research enables her to identify the premise that micro level studies maintain that foreign aid normally has positive effects. While this conclusion should be considered valid, caution should be considered. Hassoun’s book is one that outlines a proposal from her book aimed at creating a health label for investing in medicines by pharmaceuticals needed by the global poor. Hassoun has an appealing way of dealing with requirements of political legitimacy with an intention of grounding duties to helping the global poor. In my view, this is a brilliant book that executes its purpose with absolute effect.

Works Cited

Hassoun, Nicole. Globalization and Global Justice: Shrinking Distance, Expanding Obligations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Print.